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The first approach (pricing) applies Pigou’s prescription: if markets get prices wrong 
then the economist’s job is to fix the prices. The second approach (politics) considers 
environments where important actions inside organizations simply cannot be priced, 
so power and control become central. Finally, the third approach (path-dependence) 
complements the first two by shifting attention from the “between” variance to the 
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how path-dependence can cause persistent performance differences among seemingly 
similar enterprises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This essay was originally drafted for the Nobel Symposium on “Foundations of Organization.” Even that incomplete 
original draft almost tripled the length constraint for the Annual Review, so this essay provides only an overview of 
the project. In preparing both documents I benefited greatly from outstanding research assistance by Hongyi Li, 
Michael Powell, and Tommy Wang, from comments by many individuals and seminar participants, especially Nancy 
Beaulieu, Tim Bresnahan, Wouter Dessein, Mathias Dewatripont, Kathleen Eisenhardt, Oliver Hart, Rebecca 
Henderson, Niko Matouschek, Heikki Rantakari, Jan Rivkin, John Roberts, David Teece, and Eric Van den Steen, 
and from financial support during a Taussig Professorship at Harvard’s Economics Department and from the 
Program on Innovation in Markets and Organizations at MIT’s Sloan School. 
 
Inside Organizations: 
Pricing, Politics, and Path-Dependence 
 
by Robert Gibbons  
 
1. Introduction 
When economists have considered organizations, much attention has focused on the 
boundary of the firm, rather than its internal structures and processes. In contrast, this essay 
focuses on three approaches to the economic theory of internal organization—one 
substantially developed, another rapidly emerging, and a third on the horizon.  
The first approach (“pricing”) applies Pigou’s (1932) prescription: if markets get the 
prices wrong then the economist’s job is to fix the prices. The resulting models ask not only 
what prices should be attached to various actions inside organizations, but also what direct 
and indirect methods are available to set these prices. Because of its focus on pricing, this 
approach naturally addresses incentive contracts. Because it also considers indirect methods 
for setting prices, however, this approach also addresses many structures and processes 
within and between organizations, including job design, transfer pricing, and outsourcing.  
The second approach (“politics”) considers environments where important actions 
inside organizations simply cannot be priced, directly or indirectly. As a result, power and 
control become central, as in models of battles for control, lobbying those in control, and so 
on. More generally, this approach views the organization as a decision process, so issues of 
gathering and communicating information naturally arise, in addition to issues of control and 
decision-making. The politics approach has received less attention from economists than has 
the pricing approach, but it has grown rapidly over the last decade, and it has interesting 
connections to earlier work outside economics.  
Finally, the third approach (“path-dependence”) is not an alternative to either of the 
first two, but rather a complement to both. This approach shifts attention from the between 
variance to the within. That is, rather than ask how organizations confronting different 
circumstances should choose different structures and processes, the focus here is on how 
path-dependence can cause seemingly similar organizations to perform at persistently 
different levels. One important source of path-dependence connects to an important issue in 
both the pricing and politics approaches: relational contracts (i.e., agreements so rooted in the 
particulars of the parties’ circumstances that they cannot be written down and hence must be 
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self-enforced rather than adjudicated by outsiders such as courts). While both the pricing and 
politics approaches include work emphasizing the importance of relational contracts in 
steady-state outcomes, the path-dependence approach enriches the others by focusing on how 
the dynamics of building and changing relational contracts can affect which steady-state 
outcomes are reached. 
These approaches have complementary work in other disciplines. For example, on 
politics, Milgrom and Roberts’ (1988) model of influence activities echoes informal 
arguments in Crozier (1964), and the growing economic literature following Aghion and 
Tirole’s (1997) model of delegation has important roots in the Carnegie school such as Cyert 
and March (1963). Similarly, on path-dependence, there is a long tradition in strategic 
management of understanding organizational capabilities as necessarily home-grown; see 
Penrose (1959), Richardson (1972), Winter (1988), Henderson and Clark (1990), Nelson 
(1991), and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997), among many others.  
Before considering any of these approaches to the economic theory of internal 
organization, however, I emphasize this essay’s focus by beginning with a lightning review 
of the enormous literature on firms’ boundaries (in order to depart from the latter thereafter). 
1.1  “Theories of the Firm” 
The economic literature on firms’ boundaries is sometimes called “the theory of the 
firm.” Coase (1937) posed the theory’s defining question: which transactions are more 
efficiently conducted in a firm than in a market? Over the past several decades, two 
prominent theories of firms’ boundaries have emerged: transaction costs (e.g., Williamson 
(1971, 1975, 1979, 1991), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978); see also Tadelis (2010)) and 
property rights (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995); 
see also Segal and Whinston (2010)).  
Although the prototypical question in the literature on firms’ boundaries is Coase’s 
make-or-buy decision, many related problems are also important, and the breadth of this set 
of problems accounts in part for the size and continuing growth of this literature. For 
example, near the prototypical question of vertical integration, there are studies of contracts 
in vertical relationships. In addition, there are questions in corporate strategy that might be 
labeled horizontal integration (where no division produces a physical input for another, but 
managerial processes might be shared across businesses). Finally, as was noted decades ago 
(e.g., Blois (1972), Richardson (1972)), there are aspects of the “institutional structure of 
production” (Coase, 1992: 713) that do not fit neatly within the simple dichotomy between 
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integration versus non-integration (whether vertical or horizontal), including networks of 
firms and other “hybrid” governance structures. 
One indication of the huge impact that the theories of firms’ boundaries have had is that 
they have been applied in other fields within economics, including industrial organization, 
law and economics, international trade, and development economics. Furthermore, there are 
connections to fields within other social sciences, including economic sociology and positive 
political economy, as well as to management disciplines such as marketing (distribution 
channels), operations (supply chains), and international management (foreign direct 
investment). But the purpose of this sub-section is to bracket this entire literature—not only 
its prototypical application to Coase’s make-or-buy decision, but also its elaborations from 
vertical contracts to hybrid governance structures, not to mention its applications in other 
fields within economics and its connections to other social sciences and management 
disciplines.1 
1.2  Inside Organizations 
For better and worse, only an economist would think that the first question about 
organizations should be “Why isn’t this activity happening in a market?” That is, Coase’s 
question is one of the important ones: if we fail to consider the possibility that activities 
observed in an organization might have been conducted in a market, then we ignore self-
selection and hence risk attributing to organizations themselves properties that derive instead 
from the kinds of activities that actors choose to conduct in organizations; see Gibbons 
(2005a: 219-22) for further discussion. On the other hand, I fear that too much focus on 
Coase’s question (and too much description of the theory of firms’ boundaries as “the theory 
of the firm”) may cause economists and others to conclude that economics cannot or should 
not have anything to say about structures and processes inside organizations. 
Fortunately, organizational economics is making significant progress beyond the study 
of firms’ boundaries. Some of the issues being considered can be grouped into themes such 
as decision-making in organizations (power, politics, culture, leadership), employment in 
organizations (performance pay, skill development, careers in organizations), structures and 
processes in organizations (hierarchy, decentralization, resource allocation, transfer pricing), 
and organizations other than firms (agencies, states, communities). In short, a summary of 
                                                 
1 Interested readers might consult the relevant chapters from Handbooks such as Baum (2002), Gibbons and 
Roberts (2010a), and Smelser and Swedberg (2005). In particular, see Bresnahan and Levin (2010), Lafontaine 
and Slade (2010), and Ménard (2010) for evidence, which space constraints prohibit discussing here. 
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current and prospective work in organizational economics now focuses at least as much on 
activities within organizations as between. 
Even just sketching this large literature on the economics of internal organization (not 
to mention its connections to other fields within economics, other social sciences, and 
management disciplines) would be an enormous task.2 I therefore restrict attention to the 
three theoretical approaches described above. Even with this restriction, however, space 
constraints allow only quick summaries of elemental models, with many topics slighted or 
even omitted; for richer accounts of pricing, politics, and path-dependence, see Gibbons and 
Roberts (2010b), Gibbons (2010), and Gibbons and Henderson (2010), respectively.  
Finally, before launching into these three approaches, I should note that, in addition to 
bracketing the large literature on firms’ boundaries, I am also omitting an older but resurgent 
fourth theoretical approach to internal organization: models in the spirit of Marschak and 
Radner’s (1972) team theory, which ignore incentives so as to focus on information 
gathering, communication, and decision-making; see Garicano and Van Zandt (2010) for an 
elegant and comprehensive discussion of the roots, accomplishments, and prospects of this 
fourth approach. 
2.   Pricing3 
In some settings, Pigou’s prescription makes terrific sense: if markets get the prices 
wrong, then the economist’s job is to fix the prices. Furthermore, Coase (1937) gave 
economists reason to conjecture that firms exist where markets would have fared poorly. It 
may then seem a short step to suppose that, inside organizations, the economist’s job is to fix 
the prices, perhaps via an incentive contract. 
Apparently, however, economists are not able to create perfect prices (i.e., monetary 
incentives) inside organizations—since then the whole economy could be run as one gigantic 
firm. We therefore need an elemental model of imperfect incentives in organizations. The 
classic agency model (e.g., Mirrlees (1975/1999), Holmstrom (1979), and Grossman and 
Hart (1983)) derived its imperfection from the agent’s risk aversion: a sufficiently steep slope 
in an incentive contract would create first-best incentives, but it would also impose excessive 
                                                 
2 Again, see the three Handbooks for a start, especially Azoulay and Lerner (2010), Baker and Gil (2010), 
Banerjee, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010), Baron and Kreps (2010), Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2010), 
Camerer and Weber (2010), Gertner and Scharfstein (2010), Hermalin (2010), Ichniowski and Shaw (2010), 
Lazear and Oyer (2010), Moe (2010), and Waldman (2010) for evidence, which is necessarily omitted in what 
follows. 
3 This section draws on Gibbons (2005a, b). 
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risk on the agent, so the optimal tradeoff between incentives and insurance involves 
incentives below the first-best level. More recently, however, agency theory has received 
new foundations, based on the empirical reality that principals often “get what they pay for” 
from their agents.4 We develop this elemental model of imperfect pricing in Section 2.1, 
noting that imperfect pricing arises from distortionary performance measures, even if the 
agent is risk-neutral (as we assume through this essay). 
If the direct approach of incentive contracts produces imperfect prices, one then can ask 
whether indirect approaches can produce improved (if perhaps still imperfect) prices. Section 
2.2 addresses this question, describing how asset ownership and other indirect instruments 
(such as job design, transfer pricing, and so on) can be important in the quest to create 
appropriate prices for various actions inside organizations. 
All of the instruments described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2—whether direct or indirect 
approaches—are assumed to be formal, in the sense that the instrument can be enforced by a 
court. (For example, if the parties sign an incentive contract, then the indicated compensation 
will be paid.) In many settings, however, measurement and commitment problems interfere 
with formal instruments, so informal instruments merit attention. In particular, in ongoing 
relationships, the parties may utilize relational contracts. The advantage of a relational 
contract is that, since it need not be enforced by a court, it can be stated in terms that the 
court cannot assess. The disadvantage of a relational contract, however, is that it must be 
stated in terms that make the parties themselves willing to enforce it. 
Section 2.3 returns to the direct approach of trying to create appropriate prices by using 
incentive contracts, but now we consider relational incentive contracts rather than the formal 
contracts of Section 2.1. If the parties are sufficiently patient (so that the shadow of the future 
outweighs the temptation to defect today) then they can achieve perfect incentives using a 
relational incentive contract alone. More realistically, if the parties are limitedly patient then 
they may use both a formal contract and a relational contract to create incentives that are 
superior to those that can be created using either kind of contract alone.  
Finally, Section 2.4 offers a brief summary and assessment of the pricing approach. 
2.1 Distortionary Performance Measurement 
In 1975, Steven Kerr published “On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.” 
The argument was simple: you get what you pay for. I find Kerr’s observations (and much 
                                                 
4 See Section 2.2 of Lazear and Oyer (2010) for an introduction to the evidence on this point. 
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subsequent empirical work) deeply at odds with the classic agency model because the classic 
model fails to distinguish between what the Principal values and what the parties can 
measure. (Formally, in the classic model the Principal’s profit (gross of wages) is y  and the 
incentive contract is w(y).) Throughout this essay, therefore, we reject a strong but 
unremarked assumption in the classic agency model—namely, that y can be called “output,” 
as though it could easily be measured. Because y reflects everything the Principal values 
(gross of wages), it might be more appropriately called the Agent's “total contribution,” 
suggesting that y cannot be easily measured (and so cannot be an argument in formal 
incentive contracts). 
Even when contracts based on y are not available, there may be other contracts that can 
be enforced in court. These contracts are based on alternative performance measures—such 
as the quantity produced, with limited adjustment made for quality. Let p denote such a 
performance measure and consider an incentive contract w( p) , such as w  s bp . As in the 
classic agency model, a steep slope (e.g., a large value of b) will create strong incentives, but 
now the Agent’s incentives are to produce a high value of p, not of y.  
The first economic models to analyze these issues were Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) and Baker (1992). The elemental model we present here was developed by Feltham 
and Xie (1994); see Datar, Kulp and Lambert (2001) and Baker (2002) for enrichments and 
applications. 
To begin, suppose that y  a   and p  a    Then a contract based on p creates 
incentives to increase p and the induced action also increases y. But now suppose that there 
are two kinds of actions that the Agent can take, a1 and a2, and assume that costs are 
separable: 
 c(a1,a2)  12 a1
2  1
2
a2
2 . 
In this “multi-task” environment, if y  a1  a2  and p  a1    then a contract based on p 
cannot create incentives for a2 and so misses this potential contribution to y. Alternatively, if 
y  a1  and p  a1  a2   then a contract based on p creates an incentive for the Agent to 
take action a2, even though a2 is irrelevant to the Agent’s total contribution. Finally, in an 
extreme case such as y  a1   and p  a2   a contract based on p may create no value at 
all (even though y and p will be correlated because of the common noise term . 
Generalizing these examples, suppose that the technology of production is 
y  f1a1  f2a2   the technology of performance measurement is p  g1a1  g2a2   the 
DECEMBER, 2009  7 
 INSIDE ORGANIZATIONS: PRICING, POLITICS, AND PATH-DEPENDENCE 
 
contract is w  s bp , and the payoffs are y  w  to the Principal and w  c(a1,a2) to the 
Agent. The first-best actions, maximizing E(y)  c(a1,a2) , are thus a1FB  f1 and a2FB  f2. 
The timing in this model is as follows. First, the Principal offers the Agent a 
compensation contract, w  s bp .5 Second, the Agent either accepts the contract or rejects it 
in favor of an alternative employment opportunity with payoff U0. Third, the Agent chooses 
actions ( a1, a2), but the Principal cannot observe these choices. Fourth, unobserved events 
beyond the Agent’s control ,   occur. Fifth, measured performance (p) is observed by the 
Principal and the Agent (and by a Court, if necessary). Finally, the Agent receives the 
compensation specified by the contract. 
A risk-neutral Agent chooses a1 and a2 to maximize E(w)  c(a1,a2) , so the optimal 
actions are a1
*(b)  g1b and a2*(b)  g2b . To induce the first-best actions, the Principal would 
like to choose b to satisfy g1b  f1 and g2b  f2, but this is impossible unless f1 /g1  f2 /g2. 
The optimal trade-off between these goals is  
 b*  f1g1  f2g2
g1
2  g22
 f
g
cos()  , 
where is the angle between the vectors f = (f1, f2) and g = (g1, g2).  
There are two important features in b*: scaling and alignment, reflected by f g  and 
cos(), respectively. Scaling is intuitive but uninteresting. For example, if g1 and g2 are both 
much larger than f1 and f2 then the efficient contract puts a small bonus rate on p, as shown 
by f g . Alignment, however, is the key to the model. As one example, if the f and g 
vectors lie almost on top of one another (regardless of their lengths) then the incentives 
created by paying on p are valuable for increasing y. As a second example, if the f and g 
vectors are almost orthogonal to each other then the incentives created by paying on p are 
almost useless for increasing y. More generally, the efficient contract has a larger bonus rate 
b when f and g are more closely aligned, as measured by cos(). 
2.2  Incentive Systems: Indirect Instruments 
The value of the multi-task theory (including the specific “cos() model” developed 
above)  is not only that it captures the empirical reality that Principals often get what they 
pay for, but also that it motivates the search for other ways to improve incentives when the 
                                                 
5 To motivate the assumption of linear contracts, imagine that p  {0, 1} and Prob(p  1)  g
1
a
1
 g
2
a
2
, 
where f
1
, f
2
, g
1
, and g
2
 are sufficiently small. 
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direct approach of formal incentive contracting is of only limited use. Two possibilities then 
arise: first, if the direct approach is imperfect, then indirect approaches may be of interest; 
second, if formal contracts are imperfect, then relational contracts may be of interest. We 
examine these two possibilities in this sub-section and the next. 
2.2.1  The Principal Principle 
One question that the classic agency model answers naturally is “Why doesn’t the 
Principal sell the Agent the firm?” In the classic model, the Principal could do this either by 
literally selling the Agent the right to receive the payoff y or by signing an incentive contract 
w  s by  with the Agent where b 1 (and s  0 as the price the Agent pays for the firm). 
Either of these methods would create first-best incentives, but the Agent would also bear all 
the risk in y. In short, the Principal could sell the firm to the Agent but the parties choose not 
to do so. 
In the cos() model, however, the Agent is risk-neutral. We therefore now provide a 
richer model that explains why the Principal should not sell the Agent the firm in the cos() 
model. Simply put, the reason is that, in a richer setting where both the Principal and the 
Agent take important actions to increase firm value, the Principal should be the actor whose 
performance is more difficult to measure. 
Formally, suppose there are two actors ( i 1, 2), each of whom can take both a 
productive action (ai) and a manipulative action (mi). The actors’ collective contribution to 
firm value is y  a1  a2, the available performance measures are pi  giai  mi (i 1, 2) , and 
each actor’s cost function is c(ai,mi)  (ai2  mi2) /2. Suppose actor i is the Principal and signs 
the incentive contract w  s bi pi  b j p j  bij pi p j  with actor j. An optimal contract can then 
be derived from the logic of the cos() model: b
i
*  b
ij
*  0 and 
 bj
*  g j
1 g j2
  . 
Because the Principal receives y (and the actors’ productive actions are additively separable 
in producing y), the Principal has first-best incentives. The total expected payoff is therefore 
maximized by having actor i be the Principal if gi  g j . Recalling that pi  giai  mi , we have 
derived the Principal Principle stated above: the Principal should be the actor whose 
performance is more difficult to measure (in the sense that  would be larger if this actor 
were the Agent). 
2.2.2  The Agent as Employee or Contractor 
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If the identity of the Principal has been established along the lines above, it remains to 
determine whether the Agent should be an employee or an independent contractor for the 
Principal. Inspired by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), we now enrich the cos() model from 
Section 2.1 by assuming that there is a machine that the Agent uses in producing y. The 
resale value of the machine (after it is used in production) is v  h1a1  h2a2   . Like y, we 
assume that v is not contractible, so contracts continue to depend on only p. If the Principal 
owns the machine (so the Agent is an “Employee”) then the Principal’s payoff is y  v  w  
and the Agent’s is w  c . Alternatively, if the Agent owns the machine (so the Agent is a 
“Contractor”) then the Principal’s payoff is y  w  and the Agent’s is w  v  c . In short, the 
parties now have two instruments to influence the Agent’s incentives—the formal incentive 
contract and ownership of the asset—and they need not use these instruments independently; 
to the contrary, we expect different formal contracts to be optimal depending on who owns 
the asset. 
As stark illustrations of this incentive-system model, consider the following pair of 
examples. 
 Example 1: y  a1, v  a2, and p  a1 
 Example 2: y  a1, v  a2, and p  a1  a2 
In Example 1 the parties are better off having the Agent own the machine, but in Example 2 
the reverse is true. In fact, in these simple examples, with the wrong choice of asset 
ownership the parties face a “get what you pay for” problem, but with the right choice the 
parties can write incentive contracts that produce perfect prices (i.e., induce the first-best 
actions).  
2.2.3  Other Models 
There is now a collection of models describing indirect instruments that can be used to 
improve the prices for various actions inside organizations (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) on job design, Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) on transfer pricing, and Holmstrom 
(1999) on outsourcing; see also the discussion of incentives and control in Section 3.2). The 
overarching theme of these models is that no single direct or indirect instrument is likely to 
create perfect or even tolerable incentives, so multiple instruments are likely to be used in 
combination as an “incentive system” (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). 
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2.3 Relational Incentive Contracts: Informal Instruments 
In Section 2.1 we saw that the direct approach of incentive contracting produces 
imperfect prices when the available performance measures suffer from “get what you pay 
for” problems. In Section 2.2 we then saw that, when the direct approach produces imperfect 
results, indirect approaches such as asset ownership may be useful complements, perhaps 
even rescuing the possibility of perfect pricing. In this section we return to the direct 
approach of incentive contracting, now considering relational rather than formal contracts. 
Relational contracting allows subjective assessments of the Agent’s performance to 
enter the incentive contract. For example, Fast and Berg (1975) describe Lincoln Electric, 
where (to this day) a piece-rate formula ties part of a worker’s pay to objective measures of 
the worker’s output, but about half of the worker’s pay is a bonus based on the supervisor’s 
subjective assessment of the worker’s cooperation, innovation, dependability, and so on. 
More generally, relational incentive contracts often play an important role in setting prices 
inside organizations—both directly through subjective bonuses and indirectly through the 
role of subjective assessments in raises, promotions, and continued employment. 
Furthermore, relational contracts have many other uses both within and between firms, 
beyond linking pay to performance.6 Finally, relational contracts will play important roles in 
Sections 3 and 4, so this is another reason to begin discussing them here. 
To formalize the idea of relational incentive contracts, we sketch Bull’s (1987) model, 
as interpreted by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994).7 Consider a repeated game between a 
Principal and an Agent. In each period, the Agent chooses an unobservable action, a, that 
stochastically determines the Agent’s total contribution, y. For simplicity, suppose that y is 
either High ( y  H ) or Low ( y  L  H ) and that Prob(y  H | a)  a, where a  [0,1]. If 
total compensation is w, the Principal’s payoff is y  w  and the Agent’s is w  c(a), where 
c  0 and c  as a 1.  
As motivated above, y cannot be objectively measured, but we now assume that y can 
be subjectively assessed and used in a relational contract. In particular, imagine that 
compensation contracts consist of a base salary (s) and a relational-contract bonus (B), where 
the Principal promises to pay B if the subjective assessment is y  H . The timing of events 
within each period is as follows. First, the Principal offers the Agent a compensation package 
                                                 
6 See Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) for citations to both (a) early work in the sociology and 
management literatures emphasizing the general importance of informal agreements both within firms and 
between, and (b) more recent work emphasizing the role of informal agreements in ostensibly formal processes 
within organizations (such as transfer pricing) and between (such as alliances). 
7 See MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Levin (2003), and Fuchs (2007) for further developments and 
MacLeod (2007) and Malcomson (2010) for syntheses of larger literatures. 
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(s,B). Second, the Agent either accepts the compensation package (in which case s is paid) 
or rejects it in favor of an alternative employment opportunity with payoff U0. Third, if the 
Agent accepts then the Agent chooses an action at cost c(a), but the Principal does not 
observe the Agent’s action. Fourth, the Principal and the Agent observe the realization of y 
(but a court cannot). Finally, if y  H  then the Principal chooses whether to pay the Agent 
the bonus B specified in the relational contract. 
In a single-period employment relationship the Principal would choose not to pay a 
bonus, so the Agent (anticipating the Principal’s decision) would choose not to supply effort, 
so the Agent’s contribution would be y  L. Suppose that L U0 , in which case the Principal 
(anticipating the Agent’s effort choice) would not pay a salary, so the Agent would choose 
not to work for the Principal.  
But things can be different in an ongoing relationship. Formally, consider an infinitely 
repeated game in which both parties discount future payoffs at rate r. We focus on equilibria 
in which the Principal and the Agent play trigger strategies (roughly speaking, the parties 
begin by cooperating and then continue to cooperate unless one side defects, in which case 
they refuse to cooperate forever after).8 
If the Agent believes the Principal will pay the bonus B then the Agent’s optimal 
action, a*(B), satisfies c (a)  B . If the Principal offers the minimum salary that the Agent 
will accept then the Principal’s expected profit per period is 
 L  a*(B)  (H  L)  c[a*(B)]U0 V (B) U0  , 
where V(B) is the expected gross surplus from the effort induced by the bonus B. 
But should the Agent believe that the Principal will pay the bonus B? If the Principal 
does not pay the bonus then her payoff is H  s this period but zero thereafter, whereas if the 
Principal does pay the bonus then her payoff is H  s B this period but equal to the 
expected profit from the relationship thereafter. Thus, the Principal should pay the bonus if 
and only if 
 (H  s B)  1
r
[V (B) U0]  (H  s)  1r  0  , 
or B  [V (B) U0]/r . In words, the reneging temptation must be smaller than the present 
value of the net surplus from the relationship. 
                                                 
8 Because L < U0, these trigger-strategy equilibria entail optimal punishments (Abreu, 1988); see Levin 
(2003) for details. 
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Before leaving this elemental model of a relational contract, it is useful to note that if 
one tried to implement this model in practice, at least two subtle questions would quickly 
surface: (a) what constitutes bonus-worthy performance (y = H in the model)? and (b) what 
constitutes an appropriate bonus (B in the model)? That is, this elemental model focuses 
entirely on the credibility of the parties’ promises, ignoring potential imperfections in the 
clarity of these promises. As we will see in Section 4, there can be important interactions 
between these issues of clarity and credibility. 
2.4 Summary and Assessment 
In summary, the pricing approach suggests that some “prices” (monetary incentives) 
can be chosen in organizations (via bonus rates like b), but typically not for the right things 
(because of misalignment as reflected by ). Indirect prices also exist (e.g., by allocating an 
asset worth v), but still are typically not perfect; likewise, relational contracts may be 
feasible, but still are often not perfect.  
This section’s compact exposition has slighted or omitted several aspects of the pricing 
approach, such as Holmstrom’s (1982/1999) model of “career concerns” (i.e., incentives 
created by the agent’s concern for his reputation in the labor market), as well as analyses that 
combine two or more of these elemental models. As a whole, the pricing approach delivers a 
rich account of structures and processes within and between organizations. Gibbons and 
Roberts (2010b) provide a richer discussion of these and other issues. 
3. Politics9  
In some environments, important actions simply cannot be priced, directly or indirectly. 
More specifically, there are no (useful) formal pricing instruments like those described in 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2. If the parties are sufficiently patient then it may be possible to develop 
relational contracts like those described in Section 2.3, but see Section 4 for further reasons 
why this direct but informal approach to pricing also has its limits, even when the parties are 
reasonably patient (because of the interaction between credibility and clarity suggested at the 
end of Section 2.3). 
The absence of prices, however, by no means implies an absence of incentives. To the 
contrary, in such environments, those with power have incentives concerning what decisions 
                                                 
9 This section draws on Gibbons (2003, 2005a). 
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to take, those without power have incentives to lobby those who have it, and all actors have 
incentives to maintain or increase their power over time.  
These issues of power and politics in organizations are widespread and important. For 
example, Knight (1921 (1964): 254) observed that the “internal problems of the corporation, 
the protection of its various types of members and adherents against each other’s predatory 
propensities, are quite as vital as the external problem of safeguarding the public interests 
against exploitation by the corporation as a unit.”  
More recently, and closer to current economic modeling, Cyert and March (1963 
(1992)) constructed political accounts of organizational behaviors in terms of individuals’ 
decision-making, beginning from the assertions that “people (i.e., individuals) have goals; 
collectivities of people do not” and “unresolved conflict is a conspicuous feature of 
organizations” (pp. 30 and 32). For example, Cyert and March anticipated the application of 
information economics to the study of organizations, arguing that  
Where different parts of the organization have responsibility for different pieces of 
information relevant to a decision, we would expect … some attempts to manipulate 
information as a device for manipulating the decision. … [But] we cannot reasonably 
introduce the concept of communication bias without introducing its obvious 
corollary – “interpretive adjustment.” (pp. 79 and 85) 
In short, compared to the traditional description of an organization in terms of an 
organization chart, Cyert and March suggested that “The kinds of models presented in this 
book describe the organization as a decision-making process” (p. 202).  
Economic models of political behaviors in organizational decision processes have 
proliferated recently and are the focus of this section. On the other hand, relative to both the 
literature on firms’ boundaries (Section 1.1) and the literature on incentive systems (Section 
2), the economics literature on organizations as decision processes is still at an early stage. 
This section’s style therefore differs from Section 2’s, because this literature has not yet 
coalesced around a set of canonical problems, not to mention around canonical models of 
these problems (such as the cos() model or the relational-contract model). 
Section 3.1 considers models of political behaviors within fixed decision architectures 
(i.e., fixed specifications of how the decision process arrives at a decision). Section 3.2 then 
turns to models of political behaviors within endogenous decision architectures (i.e., the 
architecture is chosen to account for both the decisions and the political behaviors it will 
induce).  
DECEMBER, 2009  14 
 INSIDE ORGANIZATIONS: PRICING, POLITICS, AND PATH-DEPENDENCE 
 
Section 3.3 returns to relational contracts, for two reasons. First, the abundant evidence 
from the sociology and management literatures on the widespread importance of relational 
contracts documents that incentive schemes are not their only application (and may not even 
be the leading one). Second, and specific to Section 3.2’s discussion of endogenous decision 
architectures, there may be reason to interpret with caution the recent wave of models that 
assume that control is easy to reallocate within organizations.  
Finally, Section 3.4 offers a brief summary and assessment of economic models of 
political behaviors in organizations. 
3.1 Fixed Decision Architectures 
The literature on political behavior in fixed decision architectures includes models of 
concentrated control (where one party controls all the relevant decision rights), distributed 
control (where different decisions are controlled by different parties, such as in team 
production or committees), and contested control (where control is not yet allocated to any 
particular party or parties, so battles for control ensue). For reasons of space, we focus mostly 
on one example of concentrated control. 
3.1.1  Concentrated Control: Influence Activities 
Milgrom and Roberts (1988, 1990) developed an early model of political behavior, 
emphasizing that those in control get lobbied. More specifically, they studied an Agent’s 
incentives to undertake “influence activities” when the Principal controls a decision and 
would like to tailor the decision to the state of the world, but the Principal does not know the 
state and the Agent has an opportunity to influence the signal about the state that the 
Principal observes.  
To capture some of Milgrom and Roberts’ ideas, consider the following abstract model. 
The parties’ payoff functions are UP (s,d)  (d  s)2 and UA (s,d)  (d  (s ))2 , where 
  0. (For example, the decision might be how much capital the Principal gives the Agent 
for a project and the state of the world might reflect the productivity of the project, so the 
Agent always wants more capital than the Principal would like to give, but not arbitrarily 
much more, lest the Principal expect an unattainable return.) Following Holmstrom’s 
(1982/1999) model of career concerns, we assume that there is symmetric uncertainty about 
the state: neither the Agent nor the Principal has private information about s. The timing of 
the model is then: (1) the Agent chooses “lobbying” activities,   0 at cost k(); (2) the 
parties observe a public signal, ; (3) the Principal chooses a decision, d  D; and (4) the 
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parties receive their payoffs, Ui(s,d), where UA is gross of lobbying costs. The public signal 
in stage (2) is   s   . Both parties share the prior belief that s is Normally distributed 
with mean M and precision H (i.e., variance 1/H) and  is Normally distributed with mean 
zero and precision h. Because the state s is Normal, let D  . Finally, the cost function 
satisfies k (0)  0, k ()  , and k  0. 
The public signal  is the crux of the model: even though neither party knows the true 
state, both parties care about how the decision relates to the state, so the Principal will try to 
extract from the signal whatever information  might contain about s, prompting the Agent 
to try to move the realization of  upwards. In equilibrium, however, the Principal correctly 
anticipates the Agent’s attempts to influence  and so correctly accounts for those attempts 
when interpreting  as a signal about s, but the Agent nonetheless has an incentive to 
influence . In particular, even though the Principal is not fooled, the equilibrium level of 
lobbying cannot be zero (because if the Principal believed the Agent to be doing no lobbying, 
then the Agent would have a strong incentive to lobby). 
More precisely, in stage (3) the Principal will choose d  Es[s | ]. If the Principal’s 
conjecture about the Agent’s lobbying is ^ , then DeGroot (1970) shows that 
 Es[s |]  HM  h(  
^
)
H  h  . 
In stage (2), the Agent therefore chooses  to solve 
 
max
  0  Es,  [(
HM  h(  ^ )
H  h  (s ))
2] k() , 
which defines *(^ ), the Agent’s best response to the Principal’s conjecture. In equilibrium, 
the Principal’s conjecture must be correct, so imposing *(^ )  ^  yields the equilibrium level 
of the Agent’s lobbying activity. Denoting this equilibrium level of lobbying by* , we have 
 2 h
H  h   k (
*)  . 
Naturally, the equilibrium level *  increases with (a) the Agent’s bias , (b) the precision of 
the public signal h, and (c) the prior variance of the state 1/H.  
Milgrom and Roberts suggest three ways (not modeled here) that an organization could 
respond to the prospect of such wasteful influence activities. First, an organization could 
reduce the effectiveness of the communication channel (e.g., increasing the noise in the 
public signal, 1/h). Second, an organization could reduce the Principal’s discretion to respond 
to the signal (thus operating more by ex ante rules than on ex post information). Finally, an 
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organization could adjust its internal structures and processes away from what would 
otherwise be optimal, to reduce members’ incentives to manipulate information (e.g., 
reducing productivity to decrease the Agent’s bias ).  
3.1.2  Other Models 
There are now many models of political behaviors under concentrated, distributed, and 
contested control. As one example of distributed control, Hermalin (1998) opened a literature 
on leadership using a model with N agents who take decisions di  D at cost c(di) to create 
aggregate output y  si1N di in state s. As a simple version of Hermalin’s model, suppose 
each party’s payoff is y/N, gross of decision costs. In higher states of the world it is efficient 
for everyone to choose higher decisions (interpreted as working harder), but in all states of 
the world each agent would like the others to work harder. 
One agent (the leader) has private information about s but the other actors (followers) 
are uninformed. The leader chooses her decision first; the followers observe the leader’s 
decision and then simultaneously choose theirs. Hermalin constructs a separating equilibrium 
of this signaling game involving “leading by example,” in which the leader’s decision 
perfectly reveals s and the followers are then induced to copy the leader’s decision.  
Gibbons (2010) discusses further models of leadership, such as Brocas and Carrillo 
(2007) and Caillaud and Tirole (2007), as well as several recent models of committees 
(another instance of distributed control) and models of contested control, such as Skaperdas 
(1992) and Rajan and Zingales (2000). 
3.2  Endogenous Architectures 
Given the inefficiencies produced by political behaviors in models with fixed decision 
architectures, it is natural to ask whether changing the architecture could reduce the 
inefficiencies. Of course, changing the architecture also changes the eventual decisions, as 
well as the political behaviors, so the optimal architecture optimizes this pair of outcomes. To 
conserve space, we again focus on a single model. 
3.2.1  Formal Versus Real Authority 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) explore “rubber stamping,” meaning that the boss has the 
formal authority, but approves the subordinate’s recommendation without inspection, so the 
subordinate has the real authority, so his recommendation might disproportionately reflect his 
interests—another form of politics. Formally, suppose there are three possible projects, 
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indexed by k 1, 2, 3. Project k delivers benefits Bk to the boss and bk to the subordinate. One 
project is terrible for both parties: Bk  bk   . The other two projects deliver benefits of 0 
and B  0 to the boss and 0 and b  0 to the subordinate. With probability , the payoffs 
from the latter two projects are ( B, b ) and (0, 0); with probability 1-, the payoffs from these 
projects are ( B, 0) and (0, b).  
Initially, neither party knows which project is the terrible one, nor which project is the 
good one for him or her. Both the boss and the subordinate can try to collect information 
about which project is which, but at a cost. If the boss incurs the cost cB(E), then the boss 
learns her own payoff on each project with probability E, but learns nothing with probability 
1-E. Similarly, if the subordinate incurs the cost cs(e), then the subordinate learns his own 
payoff on each project with probability e, but learns nothing with probability 1-e (where 
these events for the subordinate are independent of those for the boss). 
To analyze the parties’ incentives to collect information, consider what happens in the 
following three situations. First, if the boss becomes informed then she will choose the 
project that pays her B. Second, if the boss remains uninformed but the subordinate becomes 
informed, then the subordinate will recommend the project that pays him b; even though the 
boss did not observe her own payoffs (and, by assumption, the subordinate does not observe 
the boss’s payoffs), the boss will accept the subordinate’s proposed project because its 
expected payoff to the boss is B  (1)  0 B  0. Finally, if neither the boss nor the 
subordinate becomes informed, then neither party will want any project to be chosen, 
because of the severity of the terrible project. From these three situations, we can compute 
first the parties’ expected payoffs and then their Nash equilibrium choices (E *, e*) . 
Aghion and Tirole proceed to argue that, when the boss has formal authority over the 
decision, one way to give the subordinate greater real authority is to overload the boss (such 
as by keeping the boss busy with other matters), thereby increasing the boss’s marginal cost 
of becoming informed. As a reduced-form example in this spirit, replace the boss’s cost 
function cB(E) with the cost function kcB(E), where k 1. Parallel analysis then produces 
equilibrium choices (E *(k), e*(k)). Changes in k cause E*(k) and e*(k) to move in opposite 
directions: if the boss works less then the subordinate works more, because the subordinate 
knows that he is likely to have the real authority to select the project. 
So far, this is an analysis of political behavior (self-interested project choice under 
rubber-stamping) in a fixed architecture (the boss has the formal authority). Aghion and 
Tirole then propose a second model in which the subordinate has the formal authority (but 
the boss may have the real authority—exactly the opposite of the case just analyzed). In this 
DECEMBER, 2009  18 
 INSIDE ORGANIZATIONS: PRICING, POLITICS, AND PATH-DEPENDENCE 
 
case, we can again compute the parties’ expected payoffs and then their equilibrium choices 
(E **, e**) . Under this new architecture, the subordinate picks the project whenever he is 
informed, instead of only when he is informed and the boss is not, so the subordinate’s 
incentive to collect information is stronger than before (e**  e*). In contrast, the boss no 
longer picks the project whenever she is informed, but instead only when she is informed and 
the subordinate is not, so the boss’s incentive to collect information is weaker than before 
(E **  E *). We reconsider this model in Section 3.3. 
3.2.2  Other Models 
There are now many models of political behaviors under endogenous decision 
architectures. As examples, three growing literatures concern (a) disobedience and dissent 
(e.g., Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2009; Marino, Matsusaka, and Zabojnik, 2009; Van den 
Steen, forthcoming), (b) communication in organizations (e.g., Dessein, 2002; Alonso, 
Dessein, and Matouschek, 2008; Rantakari, 2008), and (c) incentives and control (e.g., Athey 
and Roberts, 2001; Prendergast, 2002; Zabojnik, 2002). See Gibbons (2010) for more on 
these and related subjects. 
3.3  Relational Empowerment 
This section considers an unremarked assumption in many models of endogenous 
architectures: that a principal can irrevocably delegate control rights to an agent (without in 
effect selling the agent the firm and becoming the agent’s subordinate). Simply put, we now 
ask whether, below the top of an organization, control rights should be seen as owned or 
loaned?  
We follow Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) in 
taking the latter view: the principal may be able to use relational contracts to loan the agent 
control, but the principal remains the boss and can reassert control at will. The motivation for 
this approach comes from numerous case studies in which units within historically 
decentralized organizations found themselves more tightly controlled after circumstances 
changed (such as Foss (2003) on Oticon, on which more below). 
To fix ideas, consider a corporate parent (Principal) and a product-development lab 
(Agent) owned by the parent. If the lab incurs cost c(a) then either the lab develops a new 
product (with probability a) or not (with probability 1-a). If a new product is developed, the 
parent can then market it, in which case the lab receives x and the parent receives y; 
otherwise, both parties receive zero. Suppose that the lab always likes to see its products 
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marketed ( x  0), but a new product could either complement or cannibalize the parent’s 
existing products (specifically, y  {yL , yM , y H } where yL  yM  0  y H ).  
Space constraints prevent not only a careful analysis but even a complete description of 
this model. Nonetheless, we now present the results from this model, hoping that Sections 2.3 
and 3.2 built sufficient intuition. See Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) for a full 
description and analysis of a related model.  
In a one-shot setting, if the parent has formal authority over marketing, it will market a 
product only if y  0 (i.e., y  y H ), whereas if the lab has formal authority over marketing, it 
will market a product for all values of y (because x  0). As in Section 2.3, however, things 
can be different in an ongoing relationship. We proceed by analogy, borrowing that Section’s 
result that the bonus B is incentive-compatible if the present value of the net surplus exceeds 
the reneging temptation (i.e., B  [V (B) U0]/r).  
For concreteness, suppose that it is efficient to market products with y  yM . (Both ex 
post and ex ante efficiency considerations could underlie this assumption: ex post, perhaps 
x  yM  0  x  yL ; ex ante, perhaps the lab expends much more effort if products with 
y  yM  will be marketed rather than only those with y  y H .) Analogous to V(B) in Section 
2.3, let VHM denote the gross surplus from marketing new products with y  yM . In addition, 
let U0 denote the lab’s payoff if it works on its own projects rather than working for the 
parent in a given period. 
Consider a relational contract in which the parent is supposed to market products with 
y  yM . The parent will be tempted not to market a product with y  yM , and the size of the 
parent’s reneging temptation will be yM  0 (analogous to B). This relational contract is an 
equilibrium of the repeated game if yM  [VHM U0]/r . This equilibrium can be seen as 
(limited) empowerment, enacted via a relational contract when the parent has formal 
authority: the parent allows the lab to market some products that are not in the parent’s 
immediate interest ( yM  0), but disallows others that are too costly ( yL  yM ). 
In contrast, if the parties attempt to implement the same relational contract (namely, 
market products with y  yM ) when the lab has formal authority over marketing, the lab is 
tempted to market a product with y  yL , and the size of the lab’s reneging temptation is then 
x  0. The same relational contract is thus an equilibrium of the repeated game under the 
new architecture if x  [VHM U0]/r .  
Depending on the values of -yM and x, the relational contract of interest might be 
feasible under one architecture but not the other. That is, it might be that -yM  [VHM U0]/r  
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but x  [VHM U0]/r , or vice versa. This model thus provides a rationale for the formal 
allocation of control based on which architecture facilitates the superior relational contract. 
The resulting determinants of the efficient allocation of formal control in an ongoing 
relationship are importantly different from those in a one-shot setting.  
Given all this, how should we interpret delegation or empowerment in organizations? 
The argument here is that empowerment is a promise (i.e., a relational contract, not a formal 
one). Nonetheless, it does matter who has formal control and there are ways to change who 
has it. Following Grossman and Hart (1986), we interpret a change in formal control as a 
change in the boundary of the firm: the architecture where the lab has the formal authority is 
a spin-off; the corporate parent charters the lab as a stand-alone company and sells its entire 
stake in the new firm. We then interpret the equilibrium in this architecture (where the new 
firm markets products with y  yM ) as an alliance—a relational contract between firms, in 
which the new firm restrains itself from actions that would harm its former parent badly (in 
exchange for ongoing research funding). 
Before leaving this model of relational empowerment, it is useful to revisit the issue 
(from end of Section 2.3) of implementing this model in practice: the outcomes x and y 
would be complex objects rather than scalars, and it could be hard to specify which kinds of 
new products (i.e., which realizations of x and y) the parent is supposed to market. In short, 
this section has again focused entirely on the credibility of the parties’ promises, ignoring 
potential imperfections in the clarity of these promises, but see Section 4. 
3.4  Summary and Assessment 
Given both the importance of power and politics in organizations and the long-standing 
research interest in these issues outside economics, it may seem surprising that economic 
modeling of the political approach to decision-making in organizations got off to a relatively 
slow start. My guess is that Krugman (1995: 27) supplied the answer (originally for 
economic geography but equally applicable here): “Like it or not, … [in economics] the 
influence of ideas that have not been embalmed in models soon decays.”  
Krugman’s comment applies to both Sections 3.1 and 3.2. For example, models of 
political behaviors under fixed decision architectures can utilize standard game theory, and 
such models indeed began to emerge in the 1980s. Likewise, the literature on endogenous 
decision architectures accelerated when Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) second model (where the 
subordinate has the formal authority) reinterpreted the Grossman-Hart-Moore property-rights 
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framework as a model of alternative decision architectures within organizations, not just 
between. 
But Krugman’s remark continues in more pointed fashion, bemoaning both “sensible 
ideas that could not be … formalized” and “formalizable ideas that seemed to have missed 
the point” (p. 59). The challenge suggested by Section 3.3 regarding reinterpreting the 
property-rights framework as a model of alternative decision architectures within 
organizations is therefore to determine under what circumstances (if any) this reinterpretation 
might be a formalization that missed the point. 
4.  Path-Dependence10 
This section differs from the previous two in three respects. First, this section is rich in 
evidence and only briefly speculates about possible theories. These differences arise because 
the underlying literature is at a very early stage (at least in organizational economics, 
especially on the theoretical side).  
Second, this section seeks to broaden organizational economists’ focus from almost 
exclusively on the “between” variance to also somewhat on the “within.” That is, rather than 
ask how organizations confronting different circumstances should choose different structures 
and processes (as in Sections 1.1, 2, and 3), the question here is why organizations 
confronting seemingly similar circumstances sometimes perform at persistently different 
levels. In short, we are now asking whether internal organization can create competitive 
advantage—a question central to strategic management, if rarely asked in economics. 
Third, this section joins a small but growing literature seeking to give the noun 
“manager” and (especially) the verb “to manage” greater prominence in organizational 
economics. Borrowing Mintzberg’s (2004) distinction between “analysis” (deciding what to 
do) and “administration” (getting it done), we interpret most of the existing work in 
organizational economics as concerning the former, and we argue that important progress 
could now be made by addressing the latter.  
Tying these three themes together, this section builds toward the ideas that otherwise 
similar enterprises may perform differently because (a) they have implemented different 
management practices, (b) some of these practices depend critically on relational contracts, 
                                                 
10 This section was developed in tandem with Gibbons and Henderson (2010), so Rebecca Henderson’s crucial 
influences will be obvious in what follows. Furthermore, we could not have produced our joint work without 
enormous assistance from Nancy Beaulieu, Nicola Lacetera, and Tommy Wang, so their efforts were also 
critical here. 
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and (c) some of these relational contracts are not easy to imitate (between or even within 
firms). Relative to Sections 2.3 and 3.3, which argued that relational contracts are potentially 
very important in both the pricing and politics approaches (but analyzed stationary 
equilibria), this section makes the complementary point that path-dependence in the non-
stationary dynamics of building and changing relationships may lead to heterogeneous 
outcomes. In short, sometimes a relational contract cannot simply be announced or imported 
but instead must be home-grown. 
A standard question (from economists, if not strategy scholars or business practitioners) 
is whether persistent performance differences (hereafter, PPDs) really exist. That is, won’t 
either competition or imitation eliminate performance differences among truly similar 
enterprises, in which case measured performance differences merely indicate unmeasured 
heterogeneity? These are good questions, as long as they really are questions (as opposed to 
assertions, immune to evidence). Section 4.1 therefore summarizes several kinds of 
microeconometric evidence suggesting that persistent performance differences among 
seemingly similar enterprises do exist. Section 4.2 then describes microeconometric evidence 
that PPDs are associated with measured management practices, and Section 4.3 drills deeper 
than even the focused microeconometric studies allow, discussing case studies of building 
and changing relational contracts.  
Section 4.4 returns to theory, discussing emerging and potential models of path-
dependence in building and changing relationships. Leibenstein (1969, 1987) was the first we 
know to outline our argument, using the language of the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma to 
suggest that under-performing enterprises (those inside the production possibility frontier, or 
“X-inefficient”) might be stuck in Defect-Defect equilibria, whereas superior performers 
might have learned to play Cooperate-Cooperate. But while Leibenstein’s argument made 
appealing use of the multiple equilibria familiar from repeated-game models, neither he nor 
subsequent models like those in Sections 2.3 and 3.3 spoke directly to “stuck in” or “learned 
to.”  More recently, Kreps (1990, 1996) pointed towards formal models of the latter issues, 
but the literature then was quiet for over a decade, until a recent awakening.  
Finally, Section 4.5 discusses why it seems useful for organizational economists to 
study persistent performance differences. 
4.1  Microeconometric Evidence of PPDs 
This section offers fleeting sketches of several literatures that provide 
microeconometric evidence of PPDs among seemingly similar enterprises. There is no 
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perfect sample for this purpose; rather, we present a collage of evidence with a consistent 
central theme. See Gibbons and Henderson (2010) for greater depth. 
4.1.1  Large-sample Studies 
We begin with evidence from large-sample studies, which suggest that PPDs are not 
confined to a few exceptional industries. A large literature—Cubbin and Geroski (1987) and 
Rumelt (1991) were early contributors—has asked which has a larger influence on the 
profitability of a firm: the external workings of the market or the internal workings of the 
organization? A substantial share (often at least 30%) of the variation in firm profitability is 
attributable to persistent performance differences among firms, after controlling for industry 
and year effects.  
Another large literature has estimated production functions. For example, in a series of 
papers on the effects of research and development on productivity, Griliches and Mairesse 
(1981, 1982, 1985; Griliches, 1986) discovered substantial heterogeneity in large samples of 
firms. Similar productivity differences have now been found using a variety of estimation 
techniques in data from around the world (including by Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer 
(1999) and Klette (1999)) and shown to be persistent over 5-year periods and longer 
(including by Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) and Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003)). 
Of course, large samples create concerns that measured performance differences may 
arise because the firms are not sufficiently similar. We therefore turn next to more focused 
studies, within industry and sometimes within firm.  
4.1.2  Focused Studies 
In a classic study, Salter (1960) found that, in the British pig-iron industry during 1911-
26, the best factory was almost twice as productive as the average one. Similarly, Argote, 
Beckman, and Epple (1990) examined the 2708 Liberty ships produced in 16 separate 
shipyards during World War II. The yards used essentially standardized designs and parts, 
and the Liberty Ship was the first (and, for most of the war, only) ship produced in the yards. 
Argote et. al. focus on learning curves and so report productivity regressions controlling for 
labor, capital, and the cumulative experience and accumulated knowledge in the yard. 
Shipyard fixed effects are included and the authors remark in a footnote that the “hypothesis 
that there are no yard-specific effects is rejected at a very high significance level (p<0.001)” 
(p. 144). 
Within a firm, Chew, Bresnahan, and Clark (1990) analyzed the 40 operating units in 
the commercial-food division of a large corporation. These units were very similar along 
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multiple dimensions (e.g., all were located in the U.S., employed low-skill labor, used the 
same technology, and produced similar products for similar customers), but the top-ranked 
unit was twice as productive as the bottom-ranked unit, even after controlling for local labor-
market characteristics, size of the local product market, unionization, age of equipment, 
product quality, and local monopoly. 
Similar findings exist for many other settings including steel mills, apparel 
manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, heart surgery, and semiconductor manufacturing. We 
therefore turn from documenting PPDs to explaining them.  
4.2  Microeconometric Evidence on Management Practices (as a Source of PPDs) 
To explain PPDs, one might study whether (a) the internal workings of firms differ and 
(b) these internal differences are systematically related to performance differences. In 
principle, such differences in inner workings might be anything from organizational 
boundaries (which inputs are made or bought, what knowledge is accessed through alliances) 
to organizational structures (functional, divisionalized, or matrix organizations) to 
organizational processes (information sharing across functions, resource allocation across 
projects). To create PPDs, however, the advantageous inner workings must be difficult to 
imitate, which militates against those that are crisp and formal (such as a make-or-buy 
decision or an organizational chart) and towards those that are soft or informal. We therefore 
consider management practices, asking whether differences in these practices are related to 
productivity differences and whether these practices might be difficult to imitate. 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) surveyed 732 medium-sized manufacturing firms from 
four countries, collecting data on 18 management practices (regarding operations, 
monitoring, targets, and incentives), with each firm’s implementation of each practice scored 
from 1 to 5. Over half of the overall variation in firms’ average management scores is within 
country and three-digit industry. Furthermore, a firm’s average score is highly correlated 
with its total factor productivity, profitability, Tobin’s Q, sales growth and survival rate. In 
short, there is large-sample evidence both that management practices are heterogeneous and 
that management practices affect performance. 
In a more focused study, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) collected panel data 
on both physical output and a detailed set of management practices from 36 finishing lines in 
17 steel minimills. The data include monthly observations on eight human-resource (HR) 
practices including incentives, screening, employment security, communication, and so on. 
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (ISP) emphasize two findings: first, these HR practices are 
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observed in a few bundles, rather than being independently distributed; and second, different 
bundles are associated with substantial differences in productivity.  
For our purposes, a third aspect of ISP’s data is also worth noting: these HR practices 
may not be easy to imitate. For example, one of the questions about incentives was “Are 
operators covered by a ‘nontraditional’ incentive pay plan … [that] is sensitive to quality?” 
(p. 294). It may be easy for an HR manager to answer this question for her plant and yet hard 
for an outsider to implement the relevant management practice in another plant. (Recall the 
discussion at the end of Section 2.3 about implementing relational incentive contracts.) 
Similarly, the question about employment security asked whether “the company has 
committed to a goal of long-term employment security” (p. 294). To me, these and other 
questions that ISP posed suggest roles for relational contracts—in the extents to which the 
pay plan is “sensitive to quality,” the company has “committed” to employment security, and 
so on. 
Continuing this theme, consider Henderson and Cockburn’s (1994, 1996) studies of 
R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical industry. Using patent data at the research-program 
level for 10 firms in an unbalanced panel of about 20 years (with up to 39 research programs 
per firm), Henderson and Cockburn found that firm fixed effects account for a large share of 
the variation in research productivity at the research-program level. Using qualitative 
research methods, they developed measures of management practices at the firm level, such 
as promotion incentives for scientists to publish research (“ProPub”) and concentration of 
decision-making over resource allocation (“Dictator”). Adding either firm dummies or the 
management variables to a baseline regression increases the R-squared statistic dramatically. 
When both the dummies and the management variables are included, the dummies and 
ProPub and Dictator remain significant.11 
As with the HR practices that ISP measured in steel mills, the management practices 
that Henderson and Cockburn measured in pharmaceutical research suggest roles for 
relational contracts. For example, exactly how strong are the incentives to publish research, 
and would these incentives be equally strong if a particular publication put the firm’s 
intellectual property at risk? 
In summary, the evidence presented in this section is meant to parallel the distinction in 
Sections 2 and 3 between formal versus informal instruments. That is, management practices 
                                                 
11 The continued significance of the firm dummies suggests that the management variables are either imperfect 
or not the whole story. 
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may sound (and sometimes be) formal, but they often are importantly relational. We 
therefore turn next to case studies of building and changing relational contracts.  
4.3  Case Studies of Building and Changing Relational Contracts 
In this section we give brief descriptions of case studies intended to illustrate five 
related challenges in building or changing a relational contract: (1) Do the parties have a 
shared understanding? (2) Do they understand that their understanding is incomplete? (3) 
What happens when an incomplete understanding needs to be refined? (4) What happens 
when an understanding needs to be changed? (5) Can parties make provisions in advance for 
later changes? While we present only one case per challenge, many others could be presented 
as well. Furthermore, space constraints allow only the first case to be presented in any depth; 
see Gibbons and Henderson (2010) for richer descriptions. 
4.3.1  Shared Understanding? 
Stewart (1993) describes how Credit Suisse (CS), a large European bank, progressively 
increased its stake in the US investment bank First Boston, eventually assuming control and 
taking the company private under the name CS First Boston (CSFB). At the time, onlookers 
wondered how the firms’ cultures would interact, particularly around pay issues such as the 
large annual bonus typically paid in Wall Street firms. 
In 1990, the first year in which CS actively controlled the firm, all firms in the 
investment banking industry performed poorly. CSFB bankers were disappointed with their 
bonuses that year, but these bonuses were comparable to bonuses at other (poorly 
performing) investment banks. In 1991, CSFB improved its performance over the previous 
year, but performed somewhat worse than other top-bracket investment banking firms. CSFB 
bankers were disgruntled over their bonuses (now lower than those at competing firms), but 
the organization was still relatively new, and promises were made about “getting the bonuses 
right” the following year. In 1992, however, CSFB performed better than in ‘91 but now 
strictly worse than its competitors and bonuses were projected to be strictly lower than at 
other firms, causing a crisis at the firm. 
Roughly speaking, the Wall Street bankers asserted that the bonus policy in their 
industry was match-the-market (MTM), meaning that bonuses would be competitive with 
bonuses at other top-bracket firms. In contrast, the Swiss asserted that in their industry the 
bonus policy was pay for performance (PFP), meaning that a banker’s bonus depended on 
how he and his bank performed. 
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One notable feature of this case is that these two policies, MTM and PFP, make 
identical pay prescriptions when all firms in the industry have the same performance, as was 
broadly true in 1990 and ’91. This is a more general point: parties with different 
understandings may not appreciate that this difference exists until key events occur. A second 
notable feature of this case is that, regardless of what CS or FB actually thought in either 
1990 or 1992, the fact that each could assert in 1992 that it thought its policy was in force 
implies that this policy cannot have been common knowledge in 1990.  
4.3.2 Other Challenges 
Incomplete understandings: Consider one of the pharmaceutical firms that Henderson 
and Cockburn (1994, 1996) later coded as among the first in the industry to be “ProPub” (i.e., 
to offer promotion incentives for scientists to publish research). When such a firm was 
beginning to articulate and implement this personnel practice, prospective employees may 
have had concerns about both the credibility and the clarity of what they were being told. For 
example, a recruiter from such a firm might have told a post doc from an academic program 
that “Coming to work with us will be almost like being an assistant professor” (but perhaps 
with higher pay). The analogy to an academic job would have been intended to signal the 
significant departure by this firm from the rest of the industry’s continuing practice of not 
encouraging (or even prohibiting) employees to publish their research, but both the recruiter 
and the post doc would have known that the analogy had its limits (hence the “almost”). 
Refining an understanding: The Danish hearing-aid firm Oticon initiated radical 
empowerment of its product-development projects with a memo from CEO Lars Kolind titled 
“Think the Unthinkable” that envisioned project groups as akin to mini-businesses, each with 
its own resources, timeline, goals, and incentives. The initial results were strong, which 
subsequent commentators ascribed to “market forces” having been unleashed in the new 
organization (see Foss (2003) for discussion). But it is unclear whether Oticon’s project 
managers interpreted the market metaphor as an initial approximation (akin to “almost like 
being an assistant professor”) or something closer to literal. If the former, then they would 
have expected the metaphor to be refined as events unfolded, clarifying just how much 
autonomy project managers actually would have in the new organization; if the latter, then 
they may have been surprised and upset (perhaps akin to the Wall Street bankers at CSFB) 
when the firm’s Projects and Products Committee (staffed by the CEO and three senior 
managers) tightened control after the firm’s portfolio of projects spiraled into disarray. 
Changing the deal: In 1981, the cover of Johnson & Johnson’s annual report read 
“Decentralization = Creativity = Productivity” (Aguilar and Bhambri, 1986: 1). For decades 
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before and after, J&J was comprised of many disparate and nearly autonomous health-care 
businesses, ranging in size from a handful to thousands of employees. While the substantial 
freedom given (no, loaned) to each business was thought to increase innovation and 
initiative, it also made coordination more difficult. For example, some hospitals requested 
that a single J&J salesperson visit them, rather than one from each of the J&J companies that 
might sell to the hospital. In principle, the solution to this request was straightforward—
create a new business handling hospital sales and distribution for the relevant J&J 
companies—but having corporate headquarters create this new business must have raised 
questions for the existing businesses: if headquarters was prepared to limit these busineses’ 
historical autonomy in this way now, what would happen in the future?  
Providing for change: For over 50 years since its founding, the electronics firm 
Hewlett-Packard did not have a layoff. In the early 1990s, however, firm performance 
declined and employment practices were reconsidered, producing concerns among 
employees that the firm was about to renege. Rogers and Beer (1995: 1) describe how a 
simple diagram eventually proved useful—at least in shaping expectations about the future. 
The figure involves three concentric circles labeled “values” (innermost), “objectives” 
(middle), and “practices” (outer), suggesting that the firm’s values never change (akin to 
being written on stone tablets), while the objectives follow from the values but may change 
slowly over time (written in clay), and the practices follow from the objectives and may 
change frequently (written on a whiteboard). The firm then used the diagram to argue that 
employment security had never been a value but instead was an objective or even a practice; 
that is, the firm could have a layoff but preserve its values. Regardless of whether this 
diagram persuaded Hewlett-Packard’s employees at the time, its three nested time-scales 
seem worth considering in other settings where relational contracts must provide for change. 
4.4  Towards New Theories 
Some of the issues raised by these case studies of relational contracts are beginning to 
appear in models. Three themes in this developing literature seem particularly promising: 
learning to coordinate, learning to communicate, and learning to cooperate. In these theories, 
path-dependence produces results consistent with Winter’s (2004) observation that “Routines 
[or, here, equilibria] are necessarily home-grown.” To streamline the discussion of these 
theories, we treat not only the first topic but also the second under the assumption that the 
parties have shared interests, introducing conflicting interests only in discussing “learning to 
cooperate.” In addition to theory, there are also intriguing experiments on these issues; see 
Gibbons and Henderson (2010). 
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4.4.1  Learning to Coordinate 
In a game with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria and zero payoff to all players out of 
equilibrium, a focal point (Schelling, 1960) may command everyone’s attention. But what if 
multiple Nash equilibria offer the best payoff, or some of the payoffs out of equilibrium are 
very negative (making coordination failure very costly)? Furthermore, what if the parties 
cannot easily discuss the opportunities they perceive (as when an organization has congealed 
into functional silos and, say, the production and marketing groups have only a rudimentary 
language in common)? 
Crawford and Haller (1990) provide a pioneering analysis of such issues in a repeated 
coordination game. One of their important insights is that, absent a common language about 
actions (e.g., about the detailed production and marketing activities that might be useful in 
concert), the parties’ shared experience may facilitate coordination by allowing decentralized 
partners to label their action spaces in terms of past play. 
Blume and Franco (2007) continue in this spirit, analyzing an n-player, m-action 
coordination game with k “successes” (Nash equilibria paying 1 to all players) and mn – k 
“failures” (action-tuples where all players receive 0). The parties know the number of 
successes but not the action-tuples that will achieve them. Each player observes his own 
actions and payoffs but not the actions of other players. The optimal strategy entails mixing 
(until a success is reached) so that the players do not all change their actions in lock-step 
(which would cause the players to revisit unsuccessful action-tuples). As a result of this 
mixing, different groups of n players could take different durations to find a success. 
Whereas Blume and Franco call their work “Decentralized learning from failure,” 
Ellison and Holden (2009) take a more hierarchical approach, in which a Principal instructs 
an Agent. Each period, (1) the Agent observes the state of the world, s  S ; (2) the Agent 
chooses an action a  A; (3) the Principal sends a message m  M  to the Agent; and (4) 
both parties receive the payoff  (a,s) . A novel aspect of the model is that the Principal 
cannot communicate about a state until that state has been realized. More specifically, the 
Principal’s message dictates that if a future state is within a specified neighborhood of this 
period’s state then the Agent should take a specified action.12 When messages are of this 
form, there are more and less useful realizations of s that may occur in early periods; in 
particular, a useful realization is one that allows the Principal to specify a broad 
neighborhood. As a result, dyads whose early realizations of s are useful will perform better. 
                                                 
12 A related game would involve coordination if the Principal also chose an action and both parties receive 
 (a,s)  only if their actions match. 
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4.4.2  Learning to Communicate 
In addition to learning to coordinate, a complementary challenge is building a language, 
as in the following repeated game. In each period, (1) the Sender observes the state of the 
world, s  S ; (2) the Sender sends a message m  M  to the Receiver; (3) the Receiver 
chooses an action a  A; (4) both parties receive a payoff of 1 if the Receiver’s action is 
a*(s) and 0 otherwise; and (5) the Receiver observes the state. Suppose that both parties know 
the action rule a*(s), so the only challenge is for the Sender to communicate the state to the 
Receiver each period: they need shared understanding of an invertible mapping m : S  M . 
If the message space includes the state space, S  M , then truth-telling seems focal: the 
Sender can choose m(s)  s. But if S and M bear no relation to each other (e.g., S might be 
fruits exported by Brazil and M might be Kings of England) then building a shared language 
seems likely to be a painstaking process, with the Receiver learning the code for each new 
state after it first arises (e.g., “Henry VIII” means cantaloupe). The interesting cases are 
between these two extremes, where learning may accelerate if (i) the parties share some 
understanding before the game begins, and perhaps (ii) a useful realization of s occurs early 
in a dyad’s relationship. As an example of (i), Blume (2000) defines a partial language as a 
set of mappings that the parties understand in advance to be the only mappings the Sender 
might use. If this set is strictly smaller than the set of all possible mappings, then the partial 
language contains information that may accelerate learning (sometimes a great deal).  
4.4.3  Learning to Cooperate 
Chassang (forthcoming) analyzes how a Principal and Agent can build a relational 
contract. In each period, the Principal first chooses whether to invest or not, where investing 
imposes a cost k on the Principal but delivers a benefit b to the Agent (and not investing 
delivers zero to both parties and ends that period). If the Principal does invest then the 
actions a  A is feasible with (independent) probability p, and both parties observe which 
actions are feasible that period. 
There are two kinds of actions, unproductive and productive: A  AU U AP . An 
unproductive action costs nothing for the Agent to take but produces no output for the 
Principal, whereas a productive action costs c to take and produces output ˜ y(a) , where 
˜ y(a)  y(a)  0 with probability q and ˜ y(a)  0 with probability 1-q. It is common 
knowledge that the number of productive actions is #AP and that a given productive action 
ap  AP  produces y(ap) when it produces positive output, but initially only the Agent knows 
which actions are the productive ones. 
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As a simple case, suppose it is common knowledge that there are two productive 
actions, a0 and a1, with y(a0)  y(a1). In the first period, a0 might be feasible but a1 not, or the 
reverse, or both might be feasible, or neither. To induce the Agent to take a new productive 
action instead of an unproductive action, the Principal threatens not to invest in several future 
periods if this period’s output is zero. Note that this punishment will occur on the equilibrium 
path, because a productive action could produce zero output. In this sense, learning (i.e., 
identifying a new action as productive) is expensive. On the other hand, if an action has 
produced a positive output then the Principal knows that the action is productive, so if the 
Agent takes this action in a later period and it produces zero output then the Principal does 
not need to punish the Agent. 
Because learning is expensive (in the sense of punishments, and also in the sense of 
opportunity cost after at least one productive action has been identified), it can be optimal to 
stop learning before all productive actions are identified. Because opportunities to learn 
arrive randomly, otherwise identical dyads may stop learning after identifying different sets 
of productive actions. Thus, this model can produce persistent performance differences 
among otherwise similar dyads because of path-dependence in building a relational contract.  
4.5 Conclusion 
I find the disjunction between the literatures in organizational economics and strategy 
striking. On one hand, the major research streams in organizational economics—including 
the huge literature on firms’ boundaries, the large literature on the pricing approach, and the 
rapidly growing literature on the political approach—are all sharply focused on the between 
variance, both empirically and theoretically; PPDs are essentially absent. On the other hand, 
asking whether internal organization can create competitive advantage is a central question in 
strategic management. Drawing in part on the large and active “capabilities” segment of the 
strategy literature (see Gibbons and Henderson (2010) for discussion and references), I close 
this essay with three reasons why it seems important for organizational economists to study 
persistent performance differences (whether by adopting this section’s focus on path-
dependence in building and changing relational contracts or by some other means). 
First, PPDs are already important in fields of economics that assume (indeed, rely) on 
the existence of such differences. The literature on industry dynamics (e.g., Ericson and 
Pakes, 1995: 53, italics added) provides one example: “We provide a model of industry 
behavior which, because it incorporates … firm-specific sources of uncertainty, can generate 
the variability in the fortunes of firms observed in these data.” And the literature on 
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adjustments to trade shocks (e.g., Melitz, 2003: 1695, italics added) provides another: “This 
paper develops a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms to analyze the role of 
international trade as a catalyst for … inter-firm reallocations within an industry.” In short, 
these literatures not only are prepared to assert that PPDs exist but also find them useful for 
exploring other empirical domains. On the other hand, these literatures have so far taken the 
pragmatic approach of positing rather than explaining the existence of such differences. 
Second, the causes of PPDs may be important for policy. Since at least Cyert and 
March (1963), one reason to understand how organizations make decisions has been to 
predict how policy changes may cause changes in organizational behaviors. Cyert and March 
focused on how firms choose prices, but the same principle applies much more broadly—
both to other decisions firms make and to a range of policy initiatives that may influence 
these decisions. I find it easy to imagine that the forces inside organizations that create PPDs 
may also cause organizations to respond to policy initiatives differently than would be 
predicted from the assumption that firms costlessly and constantly optimize their choices 
from a fixed and known production possibility set. 
Finally, and most importantly, PPDs are important for economic well-being. For 
example, making General Motors as productive as Toyota could constitute a substantial 
improvement for GM’s workforce, shareholders, and beyond. In this respect, evidence of 
PPDs has inspired in me a reaction similar to Lucas’s (1988: 5) response to heterogeneous 
income levels and growth rates across countries: “I do not see how one can look at figures 
like these without seeing them as representing possibilities. … This is what we need a theory 
… for: to provide some kind of framework for organizing facts like these, for judging which 
represent opportunities and which necessities” (italics in the original).  
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